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The Death of an Unborn Child:
Jurisprudential Inconsistencies in




It makes no sense for courts to say an 'abortion' of an unborn child is legal, but
the 'wrongful death' of the same child by someone other than the mother is not
legal.'
On March 17, 1994, the Supreme Court of Montana declared that "the
State of Montana recognizes a claim of wrongful death for a stillborn
fetus."2 On January 24, 1994, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
determined that an "unborn fetus that was viable at the time of injury is
a 'human being'" within the meaning of Oklahoma's homicide statute.'
Both of these courts declared that their holdings would not affect a
woman's right to choose a lawful abortion based on her constitutional
right to privacy.'
The majority of state courts that have addressed the issue now recog-
nize the possibility of a wrongful death action against a tortfeasor who
causes the death of an unborn fetus. While some disagreement exists as
to when a fetus is at the proper stage of development to fall within a
* Murphy S. Klasing is an Assistant District Attorney in Harris County, Houston,
Texas. He received his law degree from South Texas College of Law in May 1994. He
would like to acknowledge the suggestions, assistance, and editing work that was
given freely and unselfishly by Professor Teresa Collett, a tenured Professor at South
Texas College of Law.
1. D.L Cuddy, Letters To The Editor: Free For Al-Reversing Roe v. Wade, WASH.
POST, Jan. 28, 1989, at A19.
2. Strzelczyk v. Jett, 870 P.2d 730, 733 (Mont. 1994).
3. Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 731 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
4. Id. at 734-35; Strzelczyk, 870 P.2d at 733 (Gray, J., specially concurring).
wrongful death statute, the trend is to afford protection for the unborn.
Nevertheless, courts continue to uphold a woman's right to have an abor-
tion. This Article examines the development of wrongful death jurispru-
dence as it relates to unborn children,5 criminal homicide of unborn chil-
dren," and abortion.7 This Article then explores the connections and in-
consistencies between these subjects and demonstrates the need for a
consistent definition of "person" as it relates to unborn children.'
II. CIVIL LIABILITY
"The right of recovery for the wrongful death of a person is a statutory
right."' Therefore, a plaintiffs ability to recover for the wrongful death
of a fetus in a given state depends upon how the courts in that state
interpret their own wrongful death statute. "A particular problem in-
volved in these cases is the need to determine whether the fetus is a
'person' within the meaning of the state's wrongful death statute.""0 In
these statutes, both intentional torts and negligence may form a basis for
recovery. "
From 1884 until 1946, the common law did not allow broad tort recov-
ery by or for the unborn child.'2 During that time period, when a preg-
nant woman was injured and her child was subsequently born with an
injury or deformity, only a small number of courts allowed recovery for
the injured child. 3 Courts usually offered two reasons for the denial of
recovery: "first, that the defendant could owe no duty of conduct to a
person who was not in existence at the time of the action; and second,
that the difficulty of proving any causal connection between negligence
and damage was too great, and therefore, there was too much danger of
5. See infra notes 9-170 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 171-292 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 293-335 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 336-85 and accompanying text.
9. Sheryl A. Symonds, Comment, Wrongful Death of the Fetus: Viability Is Not a
Viable Distinction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 103, 104 (1984); see, e.g., Eich v. Town
of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354, 356-57 (Ala. 1974); Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20, 24
(Ind. App. 1971). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 902
(4th ed. 1971); W. L. Heyman, Annotation, Action for Death of Unborn Child, 15
A.L.R. 3d 992, 993 (1967).
10. Symonds, supra note 9, at 104 n.13.
11. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 946 (5th
ed. 1984) ("[Wlrongful death statutes usually provide that an action can be main-
tained for 'any wrongful act, neglect or default' which causes death.").
12. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884) (holding that a
fetus who died when its mother was injured by defendant's negligence was not a
"person" for whom suit could be brought).
13. See KEETON, supra note 11, at 367.
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fictitious claims." 4 For example, in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton,'5 the court held that there was no cause of action for pre-
natal injuries, reasoning that a fetus is part of its mother and not a sepa-
rate being in its own right."6 Any injury to the fetus was actually injury
to the mother, and she could recover damages."
In 1946, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
departed from the common law rule and allowed a child to seek recov-
ery for prenatal injuries in Bonbrest v. Kotz.'8 Distinguishing Dietrich,
"the court stressed the fact that in Dietrich a nonviable child was in-
jured, was born alive, and died less than one hour later."9 In Bonbrest,
however, the child lived.' The reason these distinctions are important is
because live birth and viability are the key issues dividing the court deci-
sions in our country with regard to prenatal torts and criminal homicide
of the unborn child. Today every jurisdiction follows the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in allowing a child to recover for prenatal injuries as
long as the child is born alive.2'
Courts throughout the country disagree on when liability to the child
arises. In some states, courts charged with defining civil liability have
adopted differing standards from those used by courts adjudicating crimi-
nal liability. "[Slome courts require 'live birth' as a prerequisite for recov-
ery," others allow recovery "for prenatal injuries to a viable fetus even if
the fetus is stillborn because of the injury," and a small number of juris-
dictions allow recovery for a nonviable stillborn fetus.'
A. The "Born Alive" Rule
In all wrongful death actions, "the primary issue is whether a fetus is a
'person' within the meaning of the applicable wrongful death," criminal,
or abortion statute.' The most stringent test is the common law born




18. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
19. Michael P. McCready, Note, Recovery for the Wrongful Death of a Fetus, 25 U.
RICH. L. REV. 391, 392 (1991); Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 139-40.
20. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 140.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (1)-(2) (1977).
22. McCready, supra note 19, at 394-95.
23. Gary A. Meadows, Wrongful Death and the Lost Society of the Unborn, 13 J.
LEGAL MED. 99 (1992); see also Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass.
alive rule, which requires proof that "(1) The child was born alive and
had a living existence separate and independent from that of the mother;
and (2) the cause of death was an external force which [occurred while
in the womb]."24
This "live birth" requirement is met even if the child dies shortly after
childbirth.' Therefore, even under the common law rule, "[t]he child
who is born alive has always been considered a 'person.'"" As a person,
a child is entitled to any and all protections that are included in wrongful
death legislation."
Currently, courts of twelve jurisdictions deny recovery for the wrong-
ful death of a fetus that is not born alive.' These courts exclude fetuses
not born alive from the class of "persons" protected under the applicable
statutes through statutory construction and by looking to legislative in-
tent.n
The state of New York first instituted the "born-alive" rule in 1953 in
Kelly v. Gregory.' The New York Supreme Court (an intermediate ap-
1975).
In Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977), the California Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of claims against physicians for the wrongful death of unborn
children because "the legislature had sole authority to create law in this area." Id. at
128. The court noted that the legislature had expressly chosen to protect the rights
of the unborn in other areas and since it had not expressed that intent in the wrong-
ful death statute, the court would not create it. Id. at 132. The court, therefore, in-
ferred an affirmative legislative intent to deny recovery for the death of a fetus. Id.
24. People v. Hayner, 90 N.E.2d 23 (N.Y. 1949).
25. Kalafut v. Gruver, 389 S.E.2d 681, 684-85 (Va. 1990).
26. Symonds, supra note 9, at 108 (citing Note, The Law and the Unborn Child:
The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 349, 358 (1971)); see
also Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (Ga. 1956) ("If a
child born after an injury sustained at any period of its prenatal life can prove the
effect on it of a tort, it would have a right to recover."); Group Health Ass'n v.
Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198, 1206 (Md. 1983) (whether or not a child had reached
"viability" has no role in a wrongful death case where a 19-20 week-old fetus died
two and a half hours after birth).
27. Meadows, supra, note 23.
28. See Estate of Baby Foy v. Morningstar Resort Inc., 635 F. Supp. 741 (D.V.I.
1986); Justis v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977); Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d
357 (Fla. 1980); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1983); Milton v. Cary
Medical Ctr., 538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988); Kuhnke v. Fisher, 683 P.2d 916 (Mont. 1984),
affd in part and revd in part, 740 P.2d 625 (Mont. 1987); Smith v. Columbus Com-
munity Hosp., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 490 (Neb. 1986); Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139
(N.J. 1988); Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969); Hamby v. McDaniel,
559 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1977); Blackman v. Langford, 795 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1990);
Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1969); see also Meadows, supra
note 23, at 104.
29. Meadows, supra note 23, at 104.
30. 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (App. Div. 1953).
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pellate court) recognized that a child is legally separate from its mother,
and "separability begins at conception."3 The court emphatically stated
that "legal separability should begin where there is biological separabili-
ty... and what we know makes it possible to demonstrate clearly that
separability begins at conception."' Yet the court concluded that "[ilf
the child born after an injury sustained at any period of his pre-natal life
can prove the effect on him of the tort.... we hold he makes out a right
to recover."'
As a result of Kelly, New York permits recovery for pre-viability. inju-
ries if the child is born alive. For example, if a three week old fetus is
harmed by tortious conduct and lives to tell about it, the child can recov-
er. Thus, New York will recognize that a fetus is a "person" at concep-
tion if it survives birth, but if stillborn, the fetus loses its "person" status
and becomes a legal nonentity. If a child in New York sustains life for
one millisecond after leaving the womb, the child's estate can sue a
tortfeasor for any damages sustained after conception. In cases as late as
1985, New York continued to uphold the born-alive rule.'
In Estate of Baby Foy v. Morningstar Beach Resort, Inc.' the District
Court for the Virgin Islands had to decide if a sixteen to eighteen-week
old fetus was a "person" within its wrongful death statute. 7 Because the
Virgin Islands statute did not define "person," the court looked to other
courts in the United States to determine what definition the majority of
courts employed.'8 Without deciding upon a definition of a "person" or a
precise point of viability,' the Baby Foy court held that since most
courts would find that a fetus under twenty weeks old is not a "person,"
the sixteen to eighteen-week old fetus in this case "is not a person for
purposes of the Virgin Islands Wrongful Death Statute."' °
31. Id. at 697.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 698 (emphasis added).
34. The court defined the viability of a fetus as "such a stage of development as
to permit continued existence, under normal conditions, outside the womb." Id. at
697 (quoting AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY).
35. See, e.g., Khan v. Hip Hosp., Inc., 487 N.Y.S.2d 700, 704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)
("[Ain injured child has a right to an independent cause of action against a physician
for in utero injuries . . . only upon birth.").
36. 635 F. Supp. 741 (D.V.I. 1986).
37. Id. at 742.
38. Id. at 742-43. The court limited its examination to factually similar cases in-
volving fetuses that reached viability but were miscarried or stillborn. Id. at 743.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 744-45 (citing Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706, 708 (D. Alaska 1962))
Virginia also utilizes the "born-alive" rule after Kalafut v. Gruver."' On
March 2, 1990, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted the version of the
"born-alive" rule articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts42 and
held that "a tortfeasor who causes harm to an unborn child is subject to
liability to the child, or to the child's estate, for the harm to the child, if
the child is born alive."' In Kalafut, the child was born alive but died
less than two hours later." The court permitted the child's estate to re-
cover for his wrongful death under the Virginia Wrongful Death Statute
since the child was born alive.' Had the childbirth process lasted a little
longer and the child been stillborn two hours later, his estate would not
have been able to recover.46
Texas, the state that defended the unborn in Roe v. Wade," also re-
quires live birth prior to recovery for prenatal injuries." The Texas Su-
preme Court first announced this requirement in 1971.4" Since that time
the only substantive change to the Texas Wrongful Death Statute has
been the substitution of the word "individual" for the word "person" in
certain parts of the statute.'
(finding that a nonviable four to four and one-half month fetus was not a person
under the Alaska Wrongful Death Statute); Green v. Smith, 377 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ill.
1978) (holding that under the Illinois Wrongful Death Statutes, no cause of action
exists for a 14-week fetus unless the fetus had attained viability at the time of the
injuries or death); Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) ("[A] three-
month-old infant ... not born alive, is not a 'person' within the wrongful death
act."); Poliguin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249, 25i (N.H. 1957) (holding that "if a fetus
is non-viable at the time of injury and dies in the womb its representative can main-
tain no action" under the New Hampshire Wrongful Death Statute); West v. McCoy,
105 S.E.2d 88, 91 (S.C. 1958) (providing no cause of action exists under the South
Carolina Wrongful Death Statute for a five-month-old fetus that miscarried).
41. 389 S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1990).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869(1) (1977).
43. Kalqfut, 389 S.E.2d at 684.
44. Id. at 682.
45. Id. at 685.
46. For a good discussion of Virginia law on the wrongful death of unborn chil-
dren, see McCready, supra note 19, at 406 (concluding that the "live birth require-
ment is the most appropriate standard for Virginia at this time").
The tide in Virginia may be turning, however, since the people of that state
elected a Republican, George Allen, as governor in 1993. Although he is not staunchly
pro-life, he is against the harsh born alive rule as a definition of when life begins.
See Steven R. Hemler, et al., Abortion: A Principled Politics, NAT'L REV., Dec. 27,
1993, at 40, 41.
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. Pietila v. Crites, 851 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. 1993) ("[Tlhere is no wrongful
death or survival cause of action for the death of a fetus."); Witty v. American Gen.
Capital Distrib., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1987) ("ITihe fetus has no cause of
action for the injury until live birth.").
49. Yandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1971).
50. The statute defines a "person" as "an individual, association of individuals,
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Following the change, several cases have challenged the live birth
requirement. The first challenge was in Witty v. American General Capi-
tal Distributors, Inc.,' where the mother of a deceased unborn child
brought an action against her employer for wrongful death, as well as for
the emotional trauma and mental anguish that she suffered as a result of
losing her baby.' The Texas Court of Appeals did not do away with the
live birth requirement for wrongful death, but did chip away at it by
holding that Mrs. Witty could recover under the Wrongful Death Statute
for her emotional distress "as a result of her perception of her child's
injury following the accident.., and for the loss of her baby's society
and companionship. "' The court noted that its holding was "not depen-
dent upon a showing that the child was born alive."' The Texas Su-
preme Court overruled the court of appeals and held that a common law
claim for mental anguish is barred by the Worker's Compensation Act,
and could not be upheld under the Wrongful Death Act.' The court indi-
cated that if the legislature intended "to create a wrongful death action
for an unborn fetus, the legislature would have specifically so stated."'
In 1990, the Texas Supreme Court again stated in a per curiam opinion
that "no cause of action may be maintained for the death of a fetus un-
der the wrongful death statute until the right to bring such action is af-
forded by the legislature."
5 7
joint-stock company, or corporation or a trustee or receiver of an individual, associa-
tion of individuals, joint-stock company, or corporation." TEX. CIV. PAhc. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 71.001(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1994). According to the Revisor's Note, the
word "individual" was substituted for the word "person" in certain places because the
definition of person was too broad, See id. § 71.002 Historical Note.
The statute describes the wrongful death cause of action as "[a]n action for
actual damages arising from an injury that causes an individual's death." Id.
§ 71.002 (a).
51. 697 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
52. Id. at 638.
53. Id. at 640.
54. Id. The court found that the proper test is "whether the act that caused the
injury was wrongful and would have given [plaintiffs] child the right to sue if it had
survived the injuries." Id.
55. Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distrib., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1987).
56. Id. at 505.
57. Blackman v. Langford, 795 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (quoting
Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 506 and citing Tarrant County Dist. Hosp. v. Lobdell, 726 S.W.2d
23 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam)).
Finally, in 1992, another Texas Court of Appeals tackled the live birth
requirement in Crites v. Pietilla.' The Crites court reversed the trial
court's order of summary judgment for the defendants and stated that a
pregnant mother has a valid existing claim for mental anguish suffered as
a result of the loss of a fetus due to the doctor's negligence.' However,
the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that mental anguish damages
for the parents are not recoverable when the only asserted cause of ac-
tion is negligence toward their unborn child.' The court indicated that
this result was necessary since there is no wrongful death or survival
cause of action for the death of a fetus in Texas.
61
Courts adopting the "born-alive" rule look at the applicable statute, and
if no statutory guidance is given, assume that an unborn child does not
fit the definition of "person" so as to fall within the statute's protection.
The New York Court of Appeals opinion in Endresz v. Friedberg' typi-
fies the reasoning of these courts. The Endresz court opined that it was
a more terrible plight to be alive and injured than to be dead,' stating
that a surviving fetus had to face impaired health while the deceased
fetus did not.'
The harsh "born-alive" rule protects the tortfeasor rather than the vic-
tim since it rewards lethal tortious conduct by allowing recovery only if
the child in the womb survives.' This harshness has moved thirty-seven
jurisdictions to abolish the "born-alive" rule or "live birth" requirement,
and thirty-five of those jurisdictions have replaced it with the rule of
58. 826 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
59. Id. at 176. The appellate court distinguished this case from Witty, in that the
Workers Compensation Act did not bar recovery in the case at hand. Id.
60. Pietilla v. Crites, 851 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (citing
Blackman, 795 S.W.2d at 743).
61. Id.
62. 248 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969).
63. Id. at 903.
64. Id.
65. In Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 367 P.2d 835, 838 (Wash. 1962), the
Washington Supreme Court held that "the more just rule is that which permits a
claim to recover for prenatal injuries" regardless of live birth. Id. In a more recent
case out of Washington, a court of appeals held that a viable unborn child's cause of
action in wrongful death survives to the personal representative of his or her estate,
and in so doing decided not to "revert back to the old twist of common law, which
made it more profitable to kill than to injure .... " Cavazos v. Franklin, 867 P.2d
674, 677-78 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).




There is just as much justification to protect a viable fetus in a wrongful death
action as there is in a baby who is a week old or a day old and dies.'
From 1884, following Dietrich v. Northampton,67 until 1949, the "born-
alive" rule dominated caselaw. In 1949, the Minnesota Supreme Court
allowed recovery for prenatal injuries that caused the death of the fe-
tus.' The court held, however, that to recover for the wrongful death of
a stillborn fetus, the injury must occur after viability.' Thus, Minnesota
became the first state to adopt the "viability rule."'0
Similar to the courts retaining the "born-alive" rule, jurisdictions that
allow a cause of action for the wrongful death of a "viable" fetus focus
on the statutory definition of a "person.""' The concept of viability was
first discussed by Justice Boggs of the Illinois Supreme Court' in his
dissenting opinion in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.3 Justice Boggs ar-
gued that a fetus is "capable of independent and separate life,
and... though within the body of the mother, it is not merely a part of
her body. ..
The viability requirement has been criticized as being "impossible of
practical application" because of the difficulty in ascertaining the mo-
ment when viability occurs.75 As a result, in many close cases, "it will be
difficult... to determine if recovery shall or shall not be allowed."76
However, with the advances in medical technology, this objection to the
viability rule is becoming less persuasive. In 1973, the year of Roe v.
Wade, "a twenty-eight week old fetus had about a one in ten chance of
surviving," but with today's medical capabilities, "survival of such a fe-
tus... is nearly routine."'
66. Court May Rule if Viable Fetus is a Person, S.F. CHRON., May 2, 1988, at A2.
67. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 11 (1884).
68. Verkennes v. Coniea, 38 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Minn. 1949).
69. Id. at 841.
70. See McCready, supra note 19, at 394.
71. See generally Meadows, supra note 23.
72. Id.
73. 56 N.E. 638, 641 (Ill. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting), overruled, 114 N.E.2d 412
(Ill. 1953).
74. Id.
75. Smith v. Brennan, 151 A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960).
76. Green v. Smith, 377 N.E.2d 37, 41 (111. 1978) (Ryan, J., concurring).
77. Ethan Bronner, Medical Advances Refocus That Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, May 7,
Montana is the most recent state to abandon the "born-alive" rule in
favor of "viability." In Strzelczyk v. Jett,' the plaintiff was due to deliver
her baby on January 7, 1990.' The child was delivered stillborn on Janu-
ary 17, 1990, two days after her doctor had determined that the child was
alive.' The case was removed to federal court and the district court cer-
tified the question of whether Montana recognized a cause of action for
the wrongful death of a viable stillborn fetus to the state supreme
court.' The Montana high court looked to the language of Montana's
wrongful death statute and to its legislative history.' The statute pro-
vides: "A child conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing
person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its
subsequent birth."' Based on a statutory definition of "unborn child,"
the court declined to read the word "live" as a requirement for a cause of
action.' The opinion does indicate, however, that this may be limited to
a "full-term fetus."'
The Arizona Supreme Court in Summerfield v. Superior Court' was
called upon to decide what the legislature intended by the word "person"
in the Arizona Wrongful Death Statute." The Arizona Supreme Court
was one of the few courts that discarded the idea that just because the
"born-alive" rule was widely accepted when the Wrongful Death Statute
was written, it necessarily follows that the legislature intended to adopt
1989, at 1.
In an Ohio Court of Appeals opinion in 1959, the court noted an example of the
bizarre results that can flow from the "born-alive" rule: "Suppose, for example, viable
unborn twins suffered simultaneously the same prenatal injury of which one died
before and the other after birth. Shall there be a cause of action for the death of
the one and not for that of the other?" Stidam v. Ashmore, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108
(Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
78. Strzelczyk v. Jett, 870 P.2d 730 (Mont. 1993).
79. Id. at 731.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 732-33.
83. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-103 (1994) Interestingly, a careful reading of this defi-
nition tends to indicate that a "live birth" is required for a child to be considered an
"existing person."
84. Strzelczyk, 870 P.2d at 732-33.
85. Id.
86. 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).
87. Id. at 719. The Wrongful Death Statute states in pertinent part:
When death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and
the act, neglect, or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages in respect
thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who would have been lia-
ble if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages; ....
Id. (quoting ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-611 (1956)).
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the "born-alive" rule.' As the court aptly stated:
It is possible... that the legislature was also aware of principles contained in an
earlier doctrine: When men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, so that
there is a miscarriage, and yet no harm follows [to her], the one who hurt her
shall be fined, according as the woman's husband shall lay upon him: and he shall
pay as the judges determine. If any harm follows [to her], then you shall give life
for life ....
Since the legislature had not defined the word "person," the court was
required to do so.' The court held that an "overall legislative policy of
compensation and protection [of the fetus in other contexts] militates in
favor of construing the wrongful death statute to give parents a remedy
when their viable child is negligently killed."9 The majority of the Arizo-
na Supreme Court rejected the premise that "if the viable infant dies
immediately before birth it is not a 'person' but that if it dies immediate-
ly after birth it is a 'person.'"' The defendants in Summerfield argued
that the court's holding was contrary to the United States Supreme
Court's pronouncement that a fetus is not a "person" in Roe v. Wade.'
The court dismissed the argument stating that the "abortion question is
not relevant to the issues before us."'
In North Carolina, another state adopting the "viability" standard, a
plaintiff administrator alleged that the defendant doctor provided negli-
gent prenatal care to the child's mother who delivered a ninth-month
stillborn fetus.' The court in DiDonato v. Wortman interpreted the
North Carolina Wrongful Death Statute to mean that an action "exists if
the decedent could have maintained an action for negligence or some
other misconduct if he had survived."' With that in mind, the court held
that "any uncertainty in the meaning of the word 'person' should be re-
solved in favor of permitting an action to recover for the [death] of a
viable fetus.""7
88. Id.
89. Id. at 719-20 (quoting Exodus 21:22).
90. Id. at 720.
91. Id. at 721.
92. Id. at 722.
93. Id. at 723.
94. Id.
95. DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 490 (N.C. 1987).
96. Id. at 491 (citing Nelson v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 816 (M.D.N.C. 1982)).
97. Id. at 493.
Before leaving this area, it is noteworthy to mention a few cases on the cause
of action termed loss of society. This is a cause of action "for the loss of a broad
range of mutual benefits each family member receives from the other's continued
1. Injury When Viable
Unlike the North Carolina Supreme Court, the Ohio Supreme Court, in
Werling v. Sandy,' found that "a viable fetus which is negligently in-
jured... and subsequently stillborn," may recover in a wrongful death
action pursuant to the Ohio Wrongful Death Statute.' However, the
court cautioned that for a wrongful death action to lie, the viability of
the fetus at the time of the injury must be established."° Bound by this
limitation, and based on expert testimony, the Ohio Court of Appeals, in
another case, refused to find that a twenty-one week stillborn fetus was
viable.'"' Therefore, in Ohio, if a nonviable fetus sustains an injury, Ohio
courts will not hold the tortfeasor liable.
2. Injury During Non-Viability
In jurisdictions where viability is the benchmark, courts refuse to ex-
tend recovery when faced with a "nonviable" fetus fact pattern.
In 1990, a Missouri Court of Appeals in Rambo v. Lawson,'" held that
"a wrongful death action will lie for the tortious killing of a nonviable
fetus. '""n In that case, the plaintiff was carrying a nonviable fetus and
miscarried after a car accident.'" The plaintiffs cited the Missouri statu-
tory definition of "unborn child" in support of their argument for recov-
ery, which defined "unborn child" as "[tihe offspring of human beings
existence including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and pro-
tection." Hunt v. Chettri, 510 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Il1. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 583 N.E.2d
510 (Ill. 1991).
In Hunt, the Fifth District Appellate Court of Illinois determined that "[w]hile
parents may love and have affection for an unborn child, the [unborn] child cannot
be said to have returned such affection." Id. at 1326. Under this reasoning, the court
determined that "birth is a proper point at which to begin to measure the loss of a
child's society." Id.
In 1991, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the Hunt case and decided that
a "rebuttable presumption for loss of society exists for the wrongful death of a still-
born child." Seef v. Sutkus, 583 N.E.2d 510, 512 (Il1. 1991). The court borrowed the
reasoning of an Ohio court and stated: "We are unable to reconcile the two proposi-
tions, that if the death occurred after birth there is a cause of action, but that if it
occurred before birth there is none ... Such a distinction could lead to bizarre
results." Id. (quoting Stridan v. Ashmore, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959)).
98. 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985).
99. Id. at 1056.
100. Id. at 1054 (emphasis added).
101. Egan v. Smith, 622 N.E.2d 1191, 1193-94 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
102. No. WD 41747, 1990 WL 54277 (Mo. Ct. App. May 1, 1990) (opinions of the
Court of Appeals in cases transferred to the Supreme Court are not published in the
permanent law reports), overruled by 799 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
103. Id. at *6-*7.
104. Id. at *1.
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from the moment of conception until birth and at every stage of its bio-
logical development, including the human conceptus, zygote, morula,
blastocyst, embryo, and fetus."" The court reasoned that "[biasing the
right to recovery upon the viability of the fetus places the legal basis for
recovery for wrongful death upon shifting ground.""°
The court explained that "[mledical technology today guarantees the
viability of fetuses considered nonviable only a few years ago.""0 7 In any
event, "[t]he time when viability is achieved may vary with each pregnan-
cy .... ."'" The court determined that "[i]n light of current medical
knowledge we see no principled reason to regard viability as the determi-
nant in wrongful death actions for the death of an unborn child."'" The
court then stated that it understood there is a heightened difficulty in
proving that a nonviable fetus was in fact alive at the time of the injury
in order to prove causation, but "[dlifficulty of proof has no bearing on
the existence of a cause of action."".
In 1990, the Missouri Supreme Court overruled Rambo v. Lawson..
and held that "a nonviable fetus is not a 'person' within the meaning of
the wrongful death statute.""2 In the opinion, the court considered a
Missouri statute that clearly indicates that viability should never be an
issue, but then dismissed the statute as inapplicable because it had to do
with abortion, not wrongful death."3 The statute states:
i. The general assembly of this state finds that: (1) The life of each human being
begins at conception; (2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life,
health, and well-being; (3) The natural parents of unborn children have
protectable interests in the life, health, and well-being of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and con-
strued to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of develop-
ment, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens,
105. Id. at *2 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.015(6) (1986)).
106. Id.
107. Id. In her dissent in Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416 (1983), Justice O'Connor noted that, "whereas in 1973 we considered as
unusual viability before twenty-eight weeks, ten -years later an infant delivered at
twenty-two weeks could survive." Id. at 457 n.5 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
109. Rambo, 1990 WL 54277, at *3.
110. Id. at *5.
111. Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 63. Relying on the statute's legislative history, the court found that the
intent was to regulate abortions, not to amend the wrongful death statutes. See id. at
64.
and residents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States,
and decisional interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme Court and
specific provisions to the contrary in the statutes and constitution of this state."'
Since this language does not specifically amend the wrongful death stat-
ute, the court held that the legislature must not have intended for it to
be interpreted as doing so.
"
The dissent in Rambo attacked the logic of the majority and pointed
out that "[w]ith recent advances in embryology and medical technology,
medical proof of causation in these cases has become increasingly reli-
able, which argues for eliminating the viability or other arbitrary develop-
ment requirements altogether.""' Nevertheless, viability is now the rule
in Missouri.' 7
In two cases decided on the same day in 1993, the Alabama Supreme
Court found a lack of legislative intent to extend the protection of the
wrongful death statute to nonviable fetuses."8 In his dissent to one of
the decisions, Justice Maddox stated that the court should allow recov-
ery for a nonviable fetus because it "promote[s] the purpose of the
wrongful death statute, which is to prevent the wrongful termination of
life, even potential life.""' 9
Opinions of the Pennsylvania courts illustrate the problems inherent in
using viability as the test for wrongful death. In 1990, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania faced the question
of whether there is a wrongful death cause of action for a nonviable
fetus under Pennsylvania law in AKL v. Listwa.'2 9 The court looked for
Pennsylvania precedent for guidance on this issue, and found none."
Instead, the court considered Amadio v. Levin,'2 where the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court held that "survival and wrongful death actions lie by
the estates of stillborn children for fatal injuries they received while
114. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1986)) (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 64.
116. Id. at 68 (Holstein, J., dissenting) (quoting KEETON, supra note 11, at 369).
117. See May v. Greater Kan. City Dental Soc'y, 863 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993).
118. Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. 1993) (pointing out that no jurisdic-
tion except Georgia has extended a wrongful death statute to include a cause of
action for the death of a nonviable fetus absent direct legislative instruction); Lollar
v. Tankersley, 613 So. 2d 1249 (Ala 1993).
119. Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1245 (Maddox, J., dissenting). Justice Maddox distin-
guished the state's interest in potential human life in the context of wrongful death
actions from its interest in the context of abortion. See id. at 1247 (Maddox, J., dis-
senting).
120. AKL v. Listwa, 741 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
121. Id. at 557.
122. 501 A.2d 1085, 1086-87 (Pa. 1985).
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viable children [in their mothers' wombs]. " "' The district court noted
an observation made by the four justice majority in Amadio, that a cause
of action would exist whether or not the injury was sustained "at the
birth of a child, its viability, or some other arbitrary period of gesta-
tion ... ."4 The district court refused to rely on this dicta as control-
ling precedent, however, because two of the four justice majority had
stated in their concurrence that because the child in the case was "viable
at the time of the allegedly negligent conduct of the defendants... the
questions involved in circumstances implicating 'viability' in other ways
must be left for another day."'25 The three dissenters in that case would
have found no cause of action even for a viable fetus.'26 Therefore, the
court could not rely on Amadio as a reliable determination of whether
Pennsylvania recognizes a cause of action for a nonviable fetus. After
examining precedent in other states the AKL court decided that "the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, faced with this issue, would declare that
no cause of action for the wrongful death of a non-viable fetus ex-
ists."'27
In 1992, a Pennsylvania Court of Appeals was again confronted with
this question in McCaskill v. Philadelphia Housing Authority.'28 A
mother of a seventeen-week old fetus brought a wrongful death ac-
tion." The court found that the fetus was nonviable and therefore no
cause of action existed." ° The court, in reaching its conclusion, did
something that Missouri and other states refuse to do; it perused United
States Supreme Court abortion cases for guidance. 3' The court said
that seventeen weeks is not long enough for viability especially since
"the United States Supreme Court recently held that viability now occurs
at 23 or 24 weeks of gestation,"'32 therefore, pointing out the connection
between the two areas of the law. The court did not consider whether it
should treat the United States Supreme Court as a definitive authority in
prenatal medicine outside the abortion context.
123. AKL, 741 F. Supp. at 557 (citing Amadio, 501 A.2d at 1087).
124. Id. (citing Amadio, 501 A.2d at 1087).
125. Id. (quoting Amadio, 501 A.2d at 1101 n.7 (Zappala, J., concurring)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 559.
128. 615 A.2d 382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
129. Id. at 383.
130. Id. at 384.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810-11 (1992)).
However, in 1993, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Hudak v.
Georgy," was confronted with this very issue. In Hudak, Mrs. Hudak
was twenty-four weeks pregnant when. she delivered triplets, all born
alive.'" After about twenty minutes, two of the triplets died and the
third died ten hours later.'" All parties stipulated that the triplets were
not viable in that they could not sustain life outside the womb.'" There-
fore, the trial court dismissed the wrongful death claim because Pennsyl-
vania law does not recognize a cause of action for the wrongful death of
a nonviable fetus."7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, stating
that "interjecting the concept of viability into a situation where a child
[is] born alive confuses the issue."" The court held that viability could
not be an issue in this case since the triplets were born alive."
The following four statements summarize Pennsylvania's wrongful
death law where a fetus is concerned: (1) a fetus born alive may sue, (2)
a fetus born dead, but past the time of viability (twenty-three to twenty-
four weeks) may sue, (3) a fetus born alive, prior to twenty-three to
twenty-four weeks gestation may sue even though not "viable" under the
standard of McCaskill, but according to Hudak, and (4) a fetus born
dead, but not past the time of viability may not sue. Therefore, viability
is conclusively presumed at twenty-three to twenty-four weeks, but can
be established earlier through evidence of a live birth.
In contrast, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled in
Ferguson v. District of Columbia' that a mother did not have re-
course under a survival statute where her fetus died shortly after pre-
mature delivery. 4 ' The court had previously "rejected live birth as the
line of determining fetal rights" and had held that the fact that a fetus
was born alive is irrelevant.' The court reasoned that a fetal heartbeat
and independent breathing, outside the mother's womb, did not establish
viability.' Instead, the Court defined viability as the point at which
"the fetus has reached such a stage of development that it can live out-
side the uterus."' Since the fetus in this case was at best twenty and
133. 634 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1993).




138. Id. at 602.
139. Id. at 603.
140. 629 A.2d 15 (D.C. 1993).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 17 (citing Greater Southeast Comnunity Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394
(D.C. 1984)).
143. Id. at 18.
144. Id. (citing Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 n.8 (D.D.C. 1946)).
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one-half weeks old, the court determined that the fetus was not viable
under the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent established in abortion cases,
and therefore, the mother could not recover even if the fetus was born
alive. 1
45
3. Viability or Conception, "That is the Question"
"Today, human embryos may be removed from the uterus of the moth-
er and transferred to a recipient surrogate who is then able to deliver the
child at full term."'46 "From conception onward, the mother and the ex-
pected child are separate, living, human organisms having unique genetic
qualities."'47 "[Ilt is absurd to extend the legal fiction.., that an unborn
child is 'a part of the mother's bowels' until the fetus is viable.""
Notwithstanding such statements, only three states have determined
that a fetus is a "person" at conception, and of these, one has essentially
recanted. This section discusses these three jurisdictions.
In 1956, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in Hornbuckle v. Plantation
Pipe Line Co., 4 stated that "a child is to be considered as in being,
from the time of its conception, where it will be for the benefit of such
child to be so considered.""5 This decision expanded upon an earlier
decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals. In Porter v. Lassiter,"' the
court stated that when determining whether a cause of action exists for
the death of the child, a "fetus becomes a child when it is 'quick' or ca-
pable of moving in the mother's womb." 2 Instead of defining "quick,"
the court found that it was a fact question for the jury." The Georgia
Supreme Court followed this case with McAuley v. Wills, 5' where it
stated that in some situations a duty is owed to an unconceived (mean-
ing nonviable) child. However, the court of appeals, in 1987, rejected this
line of reasoning in Billingsley v. State."n
145. Id. at 19-20.
146. See J. ScoTT, ET AL. DANFORTH'S OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 833-841 (6th ed.
1990) (cited in Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo. 1990) (Holstein, J. dissent-
ing)).
147. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 68 (Holstein, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
148. Id.
149. 93 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1956).
150. Id. at 728.
151. 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955).
152. Id. at 102.
153. Id. at 103.
154. 303 S.E.2d 258 (Ga. 1983).
155. 360 S.E.2d 451 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); see infra notes 1-76 and accompanying
Rhode Island is often cited as a state that has held a fetus to be a
"person" at conception based on Presley v. Newport Hospital." In
Presley, the mother of a viable stillborn fetus brought a wrongful death
action.' The court in its analysis first pointed out the illogical conclu-
sions that would result from a "born-alive" rule." The court then noted
that this case really did not call into question the impact of viability.'"
Recognizing the ramifications of its holding and the possible difficulties
in proving causation, the court reiterated a prior holding'" where they
stated that the "legal right of a child 'to begin life with a sound mind and
body,' should not be abridged by difficulties in proof of causation. "...
With Presley, Rhode Island seemed to adopt a "post conception" rule
allowing recovery at any point after conception. However, in 1991, the
Rhode Island high court clarified Presley in Miccolis v. Amica Mutual
Insurance Co. '62
In Miccolis, the court held that a nonviable fetus is not a "person"
within the meaning of Rhode Island's wrongful death statute." The fe-
tus in this case was five-weeks old."u The Rhode Island Supreme Court
rejected the Presley court's language about viability, observing that "[t]he
philosophic analysis engaged in by the plurality [in Presley] was merely
dictum, however scholarly and comprehensive may have been the terms
in which it was presented.'"" The court reasoned that adopting the rule
making a fetus a "person" at conception would "give rise to actions
based upon speculation and conditions wherein predictability would be
virtually nonexistent."'" This rationale is difficult to reconcile with prior
Rhode Island case law holding that the difficulty of proof is irrelevant to
whether a cause of action should be allowed.'67
The only state to truly abandon both the "born-alive" rule and the "via-
bility" rule is Louisiana, where a fetus is a "person" at conception." Al-
text.
156. 365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976) (plurality opinion).
157. Id. at 749.
158. Id. at 753.
159. Id.
160. Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966).
161. Presley, 365 A.2d at 754 (quoting Sylvia, 220 A.2d at 224).
162. 587 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1991).
163. Id. at 69. It should be noted that the supreme court panel that decided
Miccolis in 1991 was composed of entirely different justices from the panel that de-
cided Presley in 1976. See also State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257 (R.I. 1982) (finding that
a fetus is not a "person" under the vehicular homicide statute).
164. Miccolis, 587 A.2d at 68.
165. Id. at 70.
166. Id. at 71.
167. See Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (R.I. 1966).
168. See infra notes 355-74 and accompanying text.
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though thirty-seven jurisdictions have abolished the "born-alive" rule or
"live birth" requirement for purposes of wrongful death actions,'" far
fewer have abolished this rule when determining whether a fetus is a
"person" for purposes of criminal law.'7 A comparison of how courts
view the "born-alive" rule and the "viability" rule in the criminal context
further illustrates the inconsistency and confusion surrounding the ques-
tion of when a "person" legally exists.
Ill. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
In Biflingsley v. State,'7' the Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned that
because the state penal homicide statute does not define "individual," the
legislature must have meant to follow the old common-law "born-alive"
rule.'" Despite the implications of the Georgia Supreme Court's holding
in Hornbuckle'73 that a fetus is a "person" at conception, 4 the Georgia
Court of Appeals refused to recognize criminal liability for killing an
unborn fetus, even a fetus that was in its sixth month, or twenty-fourth
week. "' Thus, Ms. Billingsley will go unpunished. for killing a sixth
month old fetus by crashing into the mother's car while having a .21
blood alcohol content.'
76
The attitude of most jurisdictions is that "[i]n the absence of statute,
the term 'person,' 'human being,' 'another,'... do not include an unborn
fetus for purposes of the crime of homicide."'" The courts restrict their
role to deciding "whether the legislature has defined a crime within con-
stitutional parameters."'7 8 The reason many states have not expanded
the majority view in the civil context of "viability" to criminal law is that
"[d]iffering objectives and considerations in tort and criminal law foster
the development of different principles governing the same factual situa-
tion."'"
169. See supra notes 66-101 and accompanying text (discussing viability).
170. See infra note 186.
171. 360 S.E.2d 451 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
172. Id. at 452.
173. 93 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1956); see supra note 150 and accompanying text.
174. Billingsley, 360 S.E.2d at 452.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 451-52.
.177. State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1978).
178. State v. Merrill, 450 N.W. 318, 324 (Minn.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990).
179. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3, at 11-13 (1972).
A. The 'Born-Alive" Rule
"In order to be charged with homicide due to prenatal ijuries, most
states require that a child be born alive and then die from the inju-
ries."""' American courts began to uniformly adopt the "born-alive" rule
during the nineteenth century.'' This view was adopted from English
common law as evidenced by this famous statement from Sir Edward
Coke:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in her
wombe, or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body, and she is
delivered of a dead childe, this is a great [misdemeanor], and no murder; but if
the childe be born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is
murder, for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura, when it
is born alive."
Historically, the inadequacy of medical technology to determine the
cause of death justified this distinction." Today, however, "medical sci-
ence can determine the proximate cause of fetal death."" In fact, the
unborn child is viewed as "the second patient..'.
Despite this fact, and the fact that thirty-seven jurisdictions have rec-
ognized a viable fetus as a "person" within the tort context, courts in
thirty jurisdictions have refused to extend the protection of the criminal
law to the unborn.'" In so doing, one motivation that has been attribut-
180. Beth D. Osowski, Note, The Need for Logic and Consistency in Fetal Rights,
68 N.D. L. REv. 171, 181 (1992) (citing State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628-29 (Minn.
1985) (holding that only a living human being could be the victim of homicide and
that the "born alive" rule is the majority rule)).
181. See Clarke v. State, 23 So. 671, 674 (Alaska 1898); State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L.
52, 54-55 (1849) (holding that it is not murder to kill a child before it is born, even
if killed in the delivery process).
182. 3 SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 50 (1648).
183. Gary V. Perko, Note, State v. Beale and The Killing of a Viable Fetus: An
Exercise in Statutory Construction and The Potential for Legislative Reform, 68 N.C.
L. REV. 1144, 1146 (1990).
184. Id. at 1147.
185. J. PRITCHARD, ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRIcs 218, 267 (17th ed. 1985). For a good
discussion on the medical science of the unborn child, see Clarke D. Forsythe, Homi-
cide of The Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21
VAL. U. L. REV. 563 (1987).
186. Forsythe, supra note 185; see also Clarke v. State, 23 So. 671 (Ala. 1898) (dis-
cussing which charges a plaintiff can bring and sustain when defendant beat pregnant
mother, causing the death of a child subsequently born living); Meadows v. State, 722
S.W.2d 584 (Ark. 1987) (holding that manslaughter statute does not include killing of
unborn, viable fetus); Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (holding that
murder statute does not include killing of unborn viable fetus, which is not a "human
being"); State v. Anonymous, 516 A.2d 156 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that
defendant's due process rights would be violated by including unborn, viable fetus as
a "human being" under murder statute); State v. McCall, 458 So. 2d 875 (Fla. Dist.
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Ct. App. 1984) (holding that crimes of homicide and manslaughter of unborn, viable
fetus do not exist); White v. State, 232 S.E.2d 57 (Ga. 1977) (finding evidence insuffi-
cient to establish elements of murder because of lack of proof that child was born
alive); People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1980) (holding that "murder" does not
include killing of and eight and one-half month old fetus unless fetus is born alive);
State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519 (1876) (holding that it was prejudicial error not to
instruct jury that actual independent circulation of child must be established in mur-
der trial); State v. Trudell, 755 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1988) (upholding district court's ruling
that aggravated vehicular homicide statute does not include death of a viable fetus,
which is not a "human being"); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983)
(dismissing murder indictment because killing of viable fetus is not murder of a "per-
son"); State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1979) (holding that although definition of
.person" was amended, killing of a fetus is still not chargeable as murder); People v.
Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the court's interpretation
of negligent homicide statute to include the death of an unborn, viable fetus would
improperly invade the province' of the legislature), appeal denied, 334 N.W.2d 616
(Mich. 1983); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985) (holding that a viable fetus
is not a "human being" under the vehicular homicide statute); Taylor v. State, 66 So.
321 (Miss. 1914) (finding evidence insufficient to establish the elements of infanticide
by mother because of inconclusive proof that the child was born alive); State v.
Doyle, 287 N.W.2d 59 (Neb. 1980) (finding evidence insufficient to prove manslaughter
against mother, because it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that child was
born alive); State in Interest of A.W.S., 440 A.2d 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)
(holding that criminal homicide does not include killing of an unborn fetus, because
it is not a "human being"); State v. Willis, 652 P.2d 1222 (N.M. App. 1982) (holding
that vehicular homicide statute does not include unborn viable fetus within the defimi-
tion of "human being"); People v. Hayner, 90 N.E.2d 23 (N.Y. 1949) (finding evidence
insufficient to sustain murder conviction because no proof, outside of defendant's
confessions, that child was born alive); State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989) (hold-
ing that murder does not include killing of viable, unborn child); State v. Sogge, 161
N.W. 1022 (N.D. 1917) (finding prejudicial error when jury instructions did not state
that direct proof that child is born alive is required to return murder verdict); State
v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1971) (holding that vehicular homicide statute
requires evidence that child was born alive); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257 (R.I.
1982) (holding that a nine-month-old unborn fetus is not a "person," so vehicular
homicide cannot be committed against it); State v. Evans, 745 S.W.2d 880 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1987) (holding that viable fetus is not a "person," under vehicular homi-
cide statute); Harris v. State, 12 S.W. 1102 (Tex. Ct. App. 1889) (finding evidence
insufficient to sustain murder conviction since there was no corroborating evidence of
mother's confessions); State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978) (holding that killing
of unborn fetus is not included in meaning of automobile homicide statute); Lane v.
Commonwealth, 258 S.E.2d 781 (Va. 1978) (finding evidence insufficient to prove that
child had been born alive, thus rendering the murder conviction unsustainable); State
ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that murder statute
does not include killing of viable, unborn child); Huebner v. State, 111 N.W. 63 (Wis.
1907) (upholding murder conviction of mother because medical evidence was suffi-
cient to show child had been born alive); Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963)
ed to these courts is their desire to avoid judicial activism in this
area. 
8 7
Only when the civil standard requires the child be born alive have
courts sought consistency in the criminal law. For example, since there
was no precedential guidance in criminal cases, the Florida Court of
Appeals looked to how the Florida Supreme Court defined "person" in
civil law." In State v. McCall,"" the court found that since the "born-
alive" doctrine persisted in Florida negligence law" and since "penal
statutes must be strictly construed,""' "'human being', for purposes of
the homicide statute is one who has been born alive."" McCall in-
volved a drunk driver crashing into a woman who was in her ninth
month of pregnancy, killing her and her unborn child."'3 The result of
this case, and others like it, is harsh, and the Florida Court of Appeals
recognized this when it contradicted itself in its holding."' The sentence
preceding the above definition of "human being" stated that "[w]e do not
hold that a viable fetus is not alive nor do we hold that a person should
not be punished for causing its death.""' Nevertheless, the court re-
fused to punish the drunk driver for the death of the fetus.
In June of 1990, the New York Court of Appeals specifically dealt with
the application of the "born-alive" rule for the first time. In People v.
Hall,"' a twenty-eight to thirty-two week old baby was born alive after
its mother sustained a gunshot wound to the abdomen. "' The baby
lived for only thirty-six hours before dying of Hyaline Membrane Dis-
ease."' The trial court found that prosecution for homicide was possi-
ble because the child was born alive, and the appellate court af-
firmed."' The court noted that because the death did not meet the defi-
(upholding mother's murder conviction when evidence sufficiently showed child was
born alive).
187. Perko, supra note 183, at 1149.
188. State v. McCall, 458 So. 2d 875, 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
189. Id.
190. Id. (citing Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968)).
191. Id. (citing Florida ex rel. Lee v. Buchanan, 191 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1966)).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 876.
194. Id. at 877.
195. Id.
196. 557 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 881-82. Hyaline Membrane Disease is also known as Respiratory Distress
Syndrome. Id. at 881. Heavy airless and congested lungs are symptomatic of the dis-
ease. Id. at 882. A doctor testified that the bullet wound to the baby's mother sev-
ered the placenta and disrupted the flow of oxygen to the fetus, increasing the
chances that the baby would develop the disease following birth. Id. at 881.
199. Id. at 880.
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nition of fetal death in New York, the baby was unquestionably a person
within the meaning of the homicide statute."l Ironically, had the mother
been shot and killed in a dark alley and not found until the next day,
there would be no criminal cause of action for homicide of the baby
because it would have been "born dead."
20 1
As in the civil arena, many states have abandoned the "born-alive" rule
within the criminal homicide context as well. Instead, a rule of viability
has been established in this area of the law that mirrors the civil law.
B. Viability
In State v. Anonymous,"2 arrest warrant affidavits were supported by
findings that a six-month pregnant woman was shot and that she, as well
as her viable, healthy, unborn baby, died. 3 In denying to issue an ar-
rest warrant for the murder of the fetus, the court reasoned, as other
courts have, that the legislature did not intend "human being" to include
an unborn fetus.'
200. Id. at 882. "[Fletal death is death prior to the complete expulsion or extraction
from its mother of a product of conception; the death is indicated by the fact that
after such separation, the fetus does not breathe or show any other evidence of life
such as beating of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of
voluntary muscles." Id. (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4160(1) (McKinney 1989)).
201. In a very interesting Kentucky case, a woman was charged with criminal child
abuse when she injected cocaine into her jugular vein while eight months pregnant.
Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 280 (Ky. 1993). The baby was born alive
with a condition known as neonatal abstinence syndrome, however, it survived this
syndrome and was healthy. two weeks later. Id. at 282. Neonatal abstinence syndrome
occurs because the supply of cocaine to the baby stops when the umbilical cord is
severed. This causes the newborn to experience withdrawals, much like those symp-
toms drug addicts suffer in rehabilitation facilities.
First, the court looked at previous authority to determine that a "fetus" is not a
"person" in the criminal law context. Id. at 281 (citing Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652
S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983) and Jones v. Commonwealth, 830 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1992)). The
court then concluded that even though this baby was born alive, since Kentucky's
criminal child abuse statutes make no mention of offenses against prenatal children,
the legislature must have intended to exclude that type of behavior from criminal
liability. Id. at 285. Justice Wintersheimer lamented the majority's conclusion in his
dissent, writing that it is with "great sadness and disappointment that . . . in Ken-
tucky the majesty of the law is unable or unwilling to protect the innocent unborn
children from harm caused by the conduct of another human being." Id. at 286
(Wintersheimer, J. dissenting).
202. 516 A.2d 156 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
203. Id. at 156-57.
204. Id. at 158.
If an unborn viable fetus was to be considered a "human being"... then, conceiv-
ably, a pregnant woman, who smokes and drinks alcoholic beverages during preg-
nancy and thereby causes the death of her unborn, might be charged with negli-
gent homicide. One would not expect the legislature to have intended such a re-
sult unless it said so explicitly."
Yet this expectation seems to vary among jurisdictions since some courts
have intervened to stop a mother's actions that are detrimental to her
unborn child.
One commentator, Clarke D. Forsythe, has disagreed with this holding:
"A homicide statute protects all human beings. To construe a homicide statute in
such a manner as to exclude an entire class of human beings is to defeat the in-
tention of the legislature .... The application of a homicide statute to an unborn
child is thus itself a strict construction, an application of the very letter of a homi-
cide statute is to encompass a human being.""
Though what Mr. Forsythe suggests may be sound, it is not widely ac-
cepted in the criminal law context. 7 For those who, like Mr. Forsythe,
would permit recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus, it is fortunate
that most jurisdictions have abandoned the "born-alive" rule in the civil
law context as outdated and archaic.2" While many of these jurisdic-
tions have not yet held that life begins at conception, many have taken
an intermediate step the rule called "viability."2"
"Today, it is undisputed that medicine is generally able to prove the
corpus delicti"' of the homicide of the unborn child."' Because of
this, courts deciding criminal cases are beginning to abandon the "born-
205. Id.
206. Forsythe, supra note 185, at 610.
207. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
209. The generally accepted definition of "viability" for purposes of this new stan-
dard focuses on the "capability of living." See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1565-66
(6th ed. 1990). It is "[a] term used to denote the power a new-born child possesses
of continuing its independent existence." The Missouri definitional statute contains a
typical definition: "That stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child
may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive
systems." Id. (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.015(7) (Vernon 1994)). The constitutionality
of this statutory definition was upheld in Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.015(7) (Vernon 1994)). It is consistent with the generally accepted definition of
viability. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1565-66 (6th ed. 1990). A "viable child" is simi-
larly defined as an "[ulnborn child who is capable of independent existence outside
his or her mother's womb, even if only in an incubator." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1566 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
210. The elements of corpus delicti of an unborn child are: "(1) proof of pregnancy
or the existence of a live fetus, (2) the death of the fetus, and (3) the criminal agen-
cy of the defendant (proximate causation)." Forsythe, supra note 185, at 577 & n.210.
211. Forsythe, supra note 185, at 579.
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alive" rule. In 1985, a unanimous Washington Supreme Court, in State v.
Edwards,2"2 expressed its opinion that medical science had rendered
the common law rule requiring the victim's survival for a certain period
after a crime obsolete:
Medical science has progressed to such a degree it makes little sense to have a
rule which requires death to occur within a particular time to resolve issues of
proof. In light of existing scientific knowledge, it would make sense for a modem
rule to be based strictly on proof of causation."'
In the criminal law context, the most frequently cited case"1 4 to sup-
port the abandoning of the common law "born-alive" rule is Common-
wealth v. Cass,"' decided in 1984. In Cass, the defendant ran his vehi-
cle into a female pedestrian who was eight and one-half months preg-
nant, killing the fetus which was later delivered stillborn by Caesarean
section."' The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered the
issue one of legislative intent, interpreting the definition of the word
"person" within the state's criminal homicide statute."7 The court ex-
plained that it had rejected the "born-alive" rule in the wrongful death
context just prior to enactment of the criminal statute,"8 and, therefore,
the legislature was presumed to have known of the court's interpretation
of the very terms the legislature included in the new statute."' The
court concluded that "[iun keeping with approved usage, and giving terms
their ordinary meaning, the word 'person' is synonymous with the term
'human being.' 228 The court stated:
212. 701 P.2d 508 (Wash. 1985).
213. Id. at 511. In Edwards, the court was discussing whether to abolish the com-
mon law "year and a day" rule that required death of a victim to occur within a
year and a day of the offense. Id. at 510. The court was unable to reject the rule as
to the defendant in that case because even though the rule had been abrogated by
statute, the statute was not in effect at the time the crime was committed and the
"year and a day" rule had been considered a substantive element of the crime under
Washington precedent. Id. at 511-12.
214. See, e.g., People v. Vercelletto, 514 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1987) (not-
ing Cass as advocating the abandonment of the "born-alive" rule and declining to
follow Cass); Meadows v. State, 722 S.W.2d 584, 586-87 (Ark. 1987); People v. Davis,
872 P.2d 591, 621 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (discussing Cass as supporting
the rejection of the common law "born-alive" rule).
215. 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984).
216. Id. at 1325.
217. Id. (construing MAss. GEN. L ch. 90, § 24G(b) (1976)).
218. Id. (citing Mone v. Greyhound Unes, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975)).
219. Id. (citing MacQuarrie v. Balch, 285 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1972)).
220. Id.
An offspring of human parents cannot reasonably be considered to be other than
a human being, and therefore a person, first within, and then in normal course
outside, the womb .... [hieretofore the law has not recognized that the pre-born
could be the victims of homicide because of difficulties in proving the cause of
death; but problems in proving causation do not detract from the personhood of
the victim."
The court went on to explain that "[miedical science now may provide
competent proof as to whether the fetus was alive at the time of a
defendant's conduct and whether his conduct was the cause of
death. ""' In support of its conclusion, the court also noted that it
would not want the death of a fetus to go unpunished when it was the
result of violence committed against a pregnant woman.M Strangely,
the court gave little reason behind using viability instead of conception
as a demarcation line. 4 A careful reading of its above reasoning shows
that the court is still grappling with the issue of when a "person" is a
"1person."
The next case that is often cited to support the abandonment of the
"born-alive" rule in criminal cases is State v. Home.25 In Home, the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina recognized that "[iut would be grossly
inconsistent for us to construe a viable fetus as a 'person' for the purpos-
es of imposing civil liability while refusing to give it a similar classifica-
tion in the criminal context.""' In this case, the defendant attacked his
wife with a knife and stabbed her repeatedly. Though the mother sur-
vived, her full-term and previously healthy fetus suffocated due to the
mother's loss of blood.227 The unanimous opinion of the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that a "viable" fetus is a "person" within South
Carolina's criminal homicide statute.2
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1328.
223. Id. at 1329 (citing Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). In Keel-
er, the defendant and his wife had obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce. Keel-
er, 470 P.2d at 618. When the defendant discovered that his wife was carrying anoth-
er man's child, he said, "I'm going to stomp it out of you," and shoved his knee into
her abdomen. Id. The eight month old fetus was delivered stillborn. Id.
In Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983), the defendant told his
wife that he did not want a child when she was seven months pregnant. Id. at 61.
fie then forced his hand into her vagina, killing the fetus. Id. at 61-62.
224. See Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1325-26.
225. 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).
226. Id. at 704.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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An Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' has also recently discard-
ed the "born-alive" rule within the criminal context. In Hughes v.
State,' the court held that a viable fetus which is stillborn is a "per-
son" within Oklahoma's manslaughter statute."I The court stated that
the purpose of the vehicular homicide statute was to protect human life
and "[a] viable fetus is nothing less than human life. " 2 The court also
pointed out that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had already recognized a
wrongful death action for a viable fetus when stillborn, and this case was
necessary to resolve the inconsistency between the two areas of law.'
However, the court stated with vigor that abortion rights are not to be
affected by this holding by noting, "We wish to make it absolutely clear
that our holding shall not affect a woman's constitutional right to choose
a lawful abortion based upon her constitutional right to privacy or a
physician's right to perform one. Neither state statute nor case law can
render a constitutionally protected abortion unlawful."'
IV. COMPARATIVE LIABILITY
A. Inconsistency Within a State: More Protection Under Civil Law
Arizona is one of the many states that has abandoned the common law
"born-alive" rule for wrongful death actions.' Following the strange
logic of its predecessors, however, Arizona has kept the "born-alive" rule
for criminal law.'
Vo v. Superior Court presented the Arizona Supreme Court with the
issue of "whether the killing of a fetus can constitute first degree mur-
der" under Arizona's homicide statute. " In the instant case, Vo rolled
down the window of his vehicle and fired two shots at a driver of a pick-
229. Oklahoma and Texas are the only two states in the union with literally two
state supreme courts. There is a supreme court for final civil appeals and a Court of
Criminal Appeals for final criminal appeals.
230. 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
231. Id. at 735.
232. Id. at 734.
233. Id. at 735.
234. Id. at 734-35.
235. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).
236. Vo v. Superior Court, 836 P.2d 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (excluding an unborn
fetus from the definition of "person" in murder statute).
237. Id. at 409; ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (1992). Section 13-1105 states in
pertinent part that "[a] person commits first degree murder if: knowing that his con-
duct will cause death, such person causes the death of another." Id. § 13-1005(A)(1).
up truck with whom he had exchanged hand gestures.2 8 A pregnant
woman, who was a passenger, was shot and killed, as well as her fe-
tus."O In analyzing the defendant's motion to dismiss below, the trial
court recognized that "the state must establish that an unborn child is a
'person' before first degree murder liability can attach."24 The trial
court rejected the motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that "the
unborn ... child was a human being, and thus a 'person' for purposes of
[Arizona's Criminal Homicide Statute]." ''
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court extensively discussed
Summerfield v. Superior Court," where the court had previously con-
strued "person" to include a viable fetus for purposes of Arizona's wrong-
ful death statute.24 3 The court noted the foundations for the
Summerfield decision, especially the fact that a majority of jurisdictions
have found that the word "person" usually does include a viable fetus in
the civil law context.244 The reasoning used in Summerfield did not,
however, apply to this case where the court was called upon to construe
the statutory meaning of "'person' and 'human being' within the limited
context of the criminal first degree murder statute."24 The court empha-
sized that it was "not embarking upon a resolution of the debate as to
'when life begins,"'246 though the result of this opinion was to define a
fetus as a person for some purposes, and not for others.
Approaching the case as one of statutory construction of a criminal
statute, the court noted that Arizona became a "code" state after the
legislature completely re-wrote the criminal code in 1977 and abolished
all common law causes of action. 4 7 Therefore, the court placed con-
straints on itself as to the development of the law that did not affect the
Summerfield court.248 The court then reasoned that since the legislature
specifically amended Arizona's manslaughter statuteA9 to include liabili-
ty for causing the death of an "unborn child" when the statute had previ-
238. Vo, 836 P.2d at 409.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 410.
241. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984); Mune v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975)). The court was construing ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1105(A)(1), 13-1101(3) (1992). Section 13-1101(3) states that
"'[pierson' means human being" in the context of this homicide statute. Id. § 13-
1101(3).
242. 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc); see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
243. Vo, 836 P.2d at 412.
244. Id.; see supra note 242 and accompanying text.
245. Vo, 836 P.2d at 412.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 413.
248. Id. at 418-19.
249. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1103(a)(1) (1992).
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ously referred only to "persons," the legislature must have intended to
"exclude a fetus from other statutes in which it is not specifically includ-
ed." ' The court concluded that because the legislature did not intend
to include a fetus in the definition of a "person" for purposes of the mur-
der statute, and the Arizona Supreme Court "does not have the power to
expand the criminal law through evolving common law principles" as the
Summerfield court did, the creation of a cause of action for the murder
of a fetus must be left to the legislature."
Interestingly, the court summed up its opinion by stating that "ttlhe
much larger metaphysical question of when does life begin? is not the
subject of this opinion."25' Again, this court and other state courts avoid
the central question by stating, that as in Vo and Summerfield, that the
word "person" can mean different things in different contexts.' The
central issue they avoid is whether a fetus is a "person."
The North Carolina Supreme Court also construed the term "person"
to include a viable fetus under the North Carolina Wrongful Death Act in
DiDonato v. Wortman.' Only two years after the DiDonato decision,
however, the same court decided not to allow the same protection for
the unborn within the criminal law context.
25
In State v. Beale,' the North Carolina Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to decide whether the unlawful killing of a viable but unborn child
was murder.a7 Once again, the "fear that expansive judicial interpreta-
tions will create penalties not originally intended by the legislature"
M
prevented the overturning of the archaic, "born-alive," rule in the crimi-
nal law scenario. 9 The court reasoned that because it found no "clear
250. Vo, 836 P.2d at 414. Another argument the court asserted to support its conclu-
sion that the "born-alive" rule should apply in the criminal context was that when
the legislature enacted the new criminal code in 1977, the "born-alive" rule was in
effect and the legislature was presumed to adopt the common law when codifying a
statute "by its common law name." Id. at 413.
251. Id. at 419.
252. Id. at 415.
253. Id. at 412.
254. 358 S.E.2d 489, 491-92 (N.C. 1987).
255. See State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.03 (5th ed.
1994). This phrase was used to justify the rule for strict construction of penal stat-
utes. Id.
259. Beale, 376 S.E.2d at 4.
legislative intent to change the common law rule that the killing of a
viable but unborn child is not murder" and because "criminal statutes
must be strictly construed," it would not extend application of the mur-
der statute to a fetus.2' The court stated that "any extension of the
crime of murder ... is best left to the discretion and wisdom of the
legislature,"2"' and "ignored the irony that Mrs. Beale, had she survived,
could have recovered monetary damages for the baby's death, but could




Vermont and West Virginia are two more examples of states that have
wisely left the "born-alive" rule in a lonely grave for civil law, yet have
resurrected it for criminal law.
In State v. Oliver,21 the Supreme Court of Vermont held, similar to
the Vo court, that the legislature intended the word "person" to mean
"individuals who have already been born."2 The court reasoned that
since the "born-alive" rule was widely accepted at the time the legislature
drafted the state's penal code, "the legislature would have defined
'person' to include a viable fetus had it intended to change the rule."22
The court also revisited the familiar language requiring that "[p]enal stat-
utes..., are to be strictly construed in a manner favorable to the ac-
cused.""
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia arrived at the same
result for similar reasons in State ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson.2 67 Two jus-
tices dissented in the case, and discussed well-reasoned points. First,
Justice McGraw criticized the court's refusal to modify the archaic "born-
alive" rule as "nothing but an abdication of duty in the face of controver-
sy."" His terse simplification of the law, as stated by the majority, was
that "[iun simple terms, you can, under our law, collect but not con-
vict.' Justice McHugh voiced similar concerns, and assured that "this
court could properly determine that an individual could be prosecuted
for the killing of a viable unborn child.""'
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Perko, supra note 183, at 1153.
263. 563 A.2d 1002 (Vt. 1989).
264. Id. at 1003.
265. Id. at 1004 n.5.
266. Id. (citing In re Hough, 458 A.2d 1134, 1136 (Vt. 1983)).
267. 332 S.E.2d 807 (W.Va. 1985).
268. Id. at 812 (McGraw, J. dissenting).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 813 (McHugh, J. dissenting).
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B. Inconsistency With Prior Precedent Within a State
In an opinion that conflicts with its own precedent, the Supreme Court
of Missouri, in State v. Knapp,"' found that causing the death of a via-
ble unborn child is perpetrating the death of a "person" within the mean-
ing of Missouri's involuntary manslaughter statute.272 What is interesting
about this case is that the court looked to other sections of the Missouri
code for a definition of a "person."27' First the court stated that "[iln
determining legislative intent, the reviewing court should take into con-
sideration statutes involving similar or related subject matter when those
statutes shed light on the meaning of the statute being construed."27"
Then the court looked to a statute it asserted was enacted as part of a
larger bill to regulate abortions that provided a definition of a "person"
which included all unborn children beginning with conception. 275 This is
the same statute that the Missouri Supreme Court in Rambo v. Lawson
said was not applicable to wrongful death claims because it dealt with
271. 843 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
272. Id. at 348.
273. Id. at 347.
274. Id. (citing State v. White, 622 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Mo. 1981) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 963 (1981)).
275. Id. The statute referred to was MISSOURi REVISED STATUTE § 1.205 (1986),
which states in pertinent part:
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the
life, health, and well-being of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and
construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of
development, all the rights privileges, and immunities available to other per-
sons, citizens, and residents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of
the United States, and decisional interpretations thereof by the United States
Supreme Court and specific provisions to the contrary in the statutes and
constitution of this state.
3. As used in this section, the term "unborn children" or "unborn child" shall
include all unborn child or children or the offspring of human beings from
the moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological develop-
ment.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action
against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to proper-
ly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular program of prenatal
care.
Id.; Knapp, 843 S.W.2d at 346-47.
abortion.21 In that case, the court said that if the legislature had intend-
ed that statute to apply to the wrongful death law, it would have so stat-
ed. " Nevertheless, although the statute did not specifically state that it
applied to the manslaughter statute in Knapp, the court found that it
did.2 78 The rule "what's good for the goose is good for the gander" ap-
parently does not apply in Missouri.
C. California and the Abolition of Viability: More Protection Under
Criminal Law
Very recently, the California Supreme Court overturned the "born-
alive" rule for purposes of criminal law, and even jumped past viability to
a new standard of "postembryonic" stage development.2" In People v.
Davis,' the California Supreme Court was called upon to define the
word "fetus" in California's murder statute. 8' The mother in Davis suf-
fered a gunshot wound that led to the stillbirth of her twenty-three to
twenty-five week old fetus. 2 At trial, medical testimony indicated that
while fetus viability at that stage was possible, it was unlikely that the
fetus would survive outside the womb.' The trial court instructed the
jury that a finding of fetal viability was necessary to convict the defen-
dant guilty of murder.' The jury found the defendant guilty, and he ar-
gued on appeal that the definition of viability given to the jury should
have focused on the "probabilities, not possibilities" of independent fetal
survival."
The Supreme Court of California determined that viability was not
even a part of the statute and should be done away with as a benchmark
for liability.'s In so doing, the majority overruled a previous court of
appeal decision which had relied on Roe v. Wade concluding that "[i]t fol-
276. Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
277. Id.
278. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d at 348-49. One factor was that the manslaughter statute was
modified as part of the same overall bill, but no direct references were made and
the language of the definitional section was broad enough to apply to the entire body
of Missouri law. Id.
279. People v. Davis, 7 Cal. 4th 797 (1994).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 800; see CAL PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1994).
282. Davis, 7 Cal. 4th at 801.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. The court did not give the jury the standard jury instruction that defines
viability, CALJIC 8.10, which defines a viable fetus as "one who has attained such
form and development of organs as to be normally capable of living outside of the
uterus." Id.
286. Id. at 802.
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lows that such destruction cannot constitute murder or other forms of
homicide, whether committed by a mother, father... or a third per-
son." ' The Davis court explained that "[tihe Roe decision... forbids
the state's protection of the unborn's interests only when these interests
conflict with the constitutional rights of the prospective parent." 8 In
other words, when the state's interest in protecting the life of an unborn
child is not counterbalanced against a mother's privacy right to an abor-
tion, or other equivalent interest, the state's interest should prevail.'
Finally, the court decided that it would use a general medical defini-
tion of the word "fetus" in the absence of a legislative definition: "Gener-
ally... a fetus is defined as 'the unborn offspring in the postembryonic
period, after major structures have been outlined.'"' 2 This period oc-
curs in humans seven or eight weeks after fertilization and is a factual
question for the trier of fact.'
California has taken bold steps to update the definition of "fetus" to
current medical technology in the criminal context but has left intact the
harsh "born-alive" rule in civil wrongful death law. All that needs to be
done, it would seem, is to amend the wrongful death statute to include
fetuses, and the California Supreme Court would probably do away with
the "born-alive" rule altogether. Although avoiding, once again, to deter-
mine the question of when life begins and a clear definition of "person,"
this court surpasses all but one other state in giving the unborn the pro-
tection they deserve. 2
287. Id. at 804 (citing People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Cal. App. 1976)).
288. Id. at 807 (quoting Jeffrey A. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting
and Respecting the Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 114
(1985)); see also Patricia A. King, The Judicial Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for
Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L REv. 1647 (1979). Professor King states:
Where the protectable interests of fully mature members do not conflict with
those of less mature members, there is no justification for ignoring the
latter's claims .... In . . . criminal law, when that interest does not oppose
a protected interest of the mature mother, the state should not hesitate to
vindicate it.
Id. at 1678.
289. Davis, 7 Cal. 4th at 807.
290. Id. at 810 (quoting THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY
281 (1987)).
291. Id.
292. A pro-life organization called The National Right to Life in Sacramento, Califor-
nia, called the ruling a "logical protection" for the unborn. Killing Nonviable Fetus
Can Be Murder, Court Says, Hous. PosT, May 17, 1994, at AS.
V. THE NEED FOR CONSISTENT LIABILITY AND THE ROLE OF ABORTION IN
FOSTERING INCONSISTENCY
A. Introduction
Since the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,
abortion has been a hot topic of debate for politicians, doctors, mothers,
women's movements, law schools, and citizens in general. Although limit-
ing a state's ability to protect the unborn child in abortion law, Roe
helped to push wrongful death law away from the harsh "born-alive" rule
into a more tempered "viability" rule, which though still unsound, pro-
vides a better result. The entire debate seems to rest on whether a fetus
is a "person" and at what stage a fetus becomes a "person" under the
various civil and criminal state statutes and common law. Although many
courts try to explain that abortion law is separate and distinct from tort
or criminal law, there would be an "inherent conflict in giving the mother
the right to terminate the pregnancy yet holding that an action may be
brought on behalf of the same fetus under the wrongful death act. " '
Many courts still argue that the issue may be considered separately be-
cause the word "person" can have different meanings in different con-
texts.
B. What does Roe v. Wade say?
It will be beneficial to study the beginning of the debate to understand
where we now stand. Although abortion law has existed since the Bibli-
cal times, and possibly before, Roe' turned what had been a state by
state issue into a national one. Despite assertions to the contrary by the
Court, one commentator has declared that in Roe, the Supreme Court
legalized abortion "from conception to birth for any and no reason."
Another interesting result of the case is that "[tioday, abortion is subject
to less regulation in the United States than in any other country in the
Western world."' The Roe Court summarized its holding as follows:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abor-
tion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health.
293. Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Mich. App. 1975).
294. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
295. Clarke D. Forsythe, A Legal Strategy to Overturn Roe v. Wade After Webster:
Some Lessons Prom Lincoln, 1991 B.Y.U. L REV. 519 (1991).
296. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 112 (1987)
[Vol. 22: 933, 19951 Jurisprudential Inconsistencies
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in
the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother. 7
This result is reached only by reaching several other sub-results, but
because wrongful death cases do not involve a balancing against the
mother's fundamental interests, the right to privacy will be left for other
commentators.' The issue relevant to a wrongful death discussion is
the same as in tort and criminal homicide statutes; the courts and legisla-
tures must decide whether a fetus is a person and if so, when does it
become a person.
The first question the Court must answer is whether a fetus is a "per-
son." The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun which some
say he will "carry to his grave," ' stated emphatically that a fetus is not
a "person." ' ° Although, the Court came to this decision to allow abor-
tion, the justices noted "[i]f this suggestion of personhood is established,
the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would
then be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.""0
However, the Court decided it need not resolve the question of when life
begins to resolve the case.' This is disingenuous. By striking down an-
ti-abortion laws, the Court in effect decided that life does not begin until
viability. To rule otherwise would mean that the Court would be giving
women the freedom to commit murder.'
The majority in Roe then seems to say that once a fetus reaches viabili-
ty, the state can regulate abortion.' This is not the case, however, be-
cause after viability the state may regulate abortion only as it "reasonably
297. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
298. The discussions are virtually too numerous to count, see, e.g., Harry F. Tepker,
Abortion, Privacy and State Constitutional Law: A Speculation If (Or When) Roe v.
Wade is Overturned, 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L 173 (1989); Dohn Delvin, Pri-
vacy and Abortion Rights Under the Louisiana State Constitution: Could Roe v.
Wade be Alive and Well in the Bayou State? 51 LA. L REV. 685 (1991).
299. High Court's Blackmun Will Exit the Bench, HousT. CHRON., April 6, 1994,
at 1.
300. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-58, 162.
301. Id. at 156-57.
302. Id. at 159.
303. "Whoever prevents life from continuing, until it arrives at perfection, is certain-
ly as culpable as if he had taken it away after that had been accomplished." MARVIN
OLASKY, ABORTION RITES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ABORTION IN AMERICA 35 (1992) (citing
JOHN BURNS, OBSERVATIONS ON ABORTION 34 (1809)).
304. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-63.
relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health."' The
Court also stated that a fetus may become viable as early as twenty-four
weeks but usually around twenty-eight weeks." If that is true, it would
seem that a state cannot regulate abortion until after the seventh month
of pregnancy. 7 As this discussion shows, the term "viability" was really
given life by the Supreme Court in Roe, and as one commentator sug-
gests, the pro-life movement and pro-choice movement alike have been
"grappling with viability" ever since.' State courts interpreting wrong-
ful death statutes and criminal homicide statutes have been struggling as
well.
C. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services," the Court had the op-
portunity to decide precisely when human life begins. The case centered
around Missouri's statutory definition of an "unborn child.""'° Although
leaving the rigid trimester approach in Roe alone, Webster moved the
demarcation line of viability down from twenty-eight weeks to twenty
weeks. " The plurality wrote that when Missouri's legislature enacted
section 188.029, it created a "presumption of viability" at the gestational
age of twenty weeks."2 The court was expanding on its earlier assertion
that "the time when viability is achieved may vary with each pregnan-
cy . . "313
Webster chipped away at Roe in its basic philosophy of human life.
Blackmun accorded very little significance to a nonviable or even a via-
ble fetus until it reached the last two months of growth. In Webster, the
305. Id. at 163.
306. Id. at 160.
307. As previously noted, one commentator has suggested that Roe "ushered in
abortion on demand from conception to birth for any reason or no reason in every
state." Forsythe, supra note 295, at 520-21 n.7. "Roe held that the states could pro-
hibit abortion after viability 'except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.'" Id. (citation omit-
ted). But the Court then expanded the exception for "health" of the mother to make
it impossible for states to prohibit any abortion after viability. "The Court held that
Roe and Doe v. Bolton, 'are to be read together,' and the Court defined 'health' in
Doe as 'all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's
age-relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors relate to health.'" Id.
(citation omitted) (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)).
308. John W. Kennedy, Pro-Life Movement Struggles For Viability, CHRISTIANTY
TODAY, Nov. 8, 1993, at 40.
309. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
310. Id. at 501; see supra note 275 and accompanying text.
311. Webster, 492 U.S. at 515-16.
312. Id.
313. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976).
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Court stated that states have a "compelling interest" in protecting the life
of the unborn child "throughout pregnancy."" ' Once again, the issue of
when life begins was at the center of the argument, even though the
Court refused to say or even acknowledge that fact.
D. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
In her dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,"5
Justice O'Connor made a clear observation. She stated that whereas in
1973 the Court considered as unusual viability before twenty-eight weeks,
ten years later an infant delivered at twenty-two weeks could survive."6
She went on to say that advances in medical knowledge in the last seven
years only bolster her conclusion that "technological improvements will
move backward the point of viability" and, therefore, the framework of
Roe "is clearly on a collision course with itself.""7
In 1992, Roe v. Wade clashed with itself in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey."1 8 The Court in Casey rejected the rigid trimester framework of
Roe but made clear that Roe was not overruled; its standards were mere-
ly modified.1 9 The Court announced that "[1]iberty must not be extin-
guished for want of a line that is clear. And it falls to us to give some
real substance to the woman's liberty to determine whether to carry her
pregnancy to full term." ' ° Therefore, the Court concluded that "the line
should be drawn at viability, so that before that time the woman has a
right to choose to terminate her pregnancy."" The Court offered two
314. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519.
315. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
316. Id. at 457 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that "recent stud-
ies have demonstrated increasingly earlier fetal viability." Id. at 456 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
317. Id. at 458.
318. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
319. Id. at 2818.
320. Id. at 2816.
321. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that at the "heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life." She further opined:
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physi-
cal constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have
from the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride
that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of
love cannot alone be ground for the State to insist she make the sacrifice.
Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
reasons for its conclusion: stare decisis and the concept of viability,
specifically, "the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintain-
ing and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent exis-
tence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of
state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman."'  The
Court did, however, abandon the theory that an abortion is a fundamen-
tal right, terming it a protected liberty interest, and also it deciding to
analyze abortion regulations under the "undue burden" test rather than
the strict scrutiny test applied in the past.'
E. Courts and the Abortion Issue
It is noteworthy that at least twenty-eight reported cases from seven-
teen jurisdictions expressly state that the purpose for nineteenth century
laws banning abortion was at least in part to protect the life of the un-
born child.2 4 As a result of the decision of Supreme Court of the United
more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision
has been in the course of our history and our culture.
Id. at 2807.
322. Id. at 2817.
323. Id. at 2819. Before Casey, the right to terminate a pregnancy was characterized
as a fundamental right under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973). Where a fundamental right is being
infringed upon by state action, the Court applies the strict scrutiny standard, which
requires that the state have a "compelling state interest" in the activity being regulat-
ed, and that the regulation be "closely tailored" to achieving that interest through the
least restrictive means possible. Id. After Casey, abortion was no longer a fundamen-
tal right, so the Court adopted a new test-the undue burden test-which allows a
state to regulate an activity as long as the statute's purpose or effect is not a sub-
stantial obstacle to engaging in that activity. Casey, 112 S. Ct at 2820. Accordingly,
states can now regulate abortion during all phases of the pregnancy, as long as it
does not constitute an undue burden. Id. For example, the Court stated that it is not
an undue burden for a state to require a reasonable waiting period before allowing a
woman to have an abortion. Id. at 2825. See generally Stefanie L Black, Competing
Interests in the Fetus: A Look Into Paternal Rights After Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 987 (1993).
324. Forsythe, supra note 295, at 531 n.44 (citing Rosen v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-32 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated, 412 U.S. 902 (1973);
Trent v. State, 73 So. 834, 836 (Ala. Ct. App. 1916); Dougherty v. People, 1 Colo. 514,
522-23 (1872); Passley v. State, 21 S.E.2d 230, 232 (Ga. 1942); Nash v. Meyer, 31 P.2d
273, 280 (Idaho 1934); State v. Alcom, 64 P. 1014, 1019 (Idaho 1901); Joy v. Brown,
252 P.2d 889, 892 (Kan. 1953); State v. Miller, 133 P. 878, 879 (Kan. 1913); State v.
Watson, 1 P. 770, 771-72 (Kan. 1883); State v. Rudman, 136 A. 817, 819 (Me. 1927);
Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 57-59 (1851); Hans v. State, 22 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Neb.
1946), vacated, 25 N.W.2d 35 (Neb. 1946); Edwards v. State, 112 N.W. 611, 613 (Neb.
1907); State v. Siciliano, 121 A.2d 490, 495 (N.J. 1956); State v. Gedicke, 43 NJ.L 86,
89-90, 96 (1881); State v. Hoover, 113 S.E.2d 281, 283 (N.C. 1960); State v. Powell,
106 S.E.2d 133 (N.C. 1921); State v. Tippie, 105 N.E. 75, 77 (Ohio 1913); State v.
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States, state supreme courts are limited in how they can define "person"
for the purposes of other statutes. To accomplish their individual goals
they must either rule in line with Roe and Casey, or they must justify
their opinion as not affecting those decisions.
For example, in Rambo v. Lawson,' a Missouri Court of Appeals
found that a fetus was a "person" at conception.' So as not to conflict
with United States Supreme Court precedent, the Missouri Supreme
Court overturned the case, stating:
We do not question the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade that the viability
of a fetus plays a major role in determining when a woman may obtain an abor-
tion and when the state may restrict her right.
Only the unique relationship between a mother and her fetus requires the striking
of this balance between the woman's fundamental right to privacy and the state's
interest in protecting fetal life. That unique relationship explains the imposition of
the concept of viability in governing abortion rights. Otherwise, we find no rea-
son, especially given the rapidity and inevitability of medical progress, to deny all
rights inherent in personhood to a nonviable fetus.'
Apparently, because of the unique relationship between a mother and her
fetus, a woman is allowed to perform a harmful action that would not be
allowed by others. One justice of the Montana Supreme Court explained
this conclusion by noting that wrongful death involves negligence, where-
as abortion involves the "intentional, consensual act by a woman and her
physician, which the law specifically allows." '
The Arizona Supreme Court explained that the "word 'person' can
mean different things in different contexts. " ' The court noted that
while Roe balanced the rights of a fetus against those of its mother and
Barker, 28 Ohio St. 583, 586 (1876); Wilson v. State, 2 Ohio St. 319, 321 (1853);
Bowlan v. Lunsford, 54 P.2d 666, 668 (Okla. 1936); State v. Auspland, 167 P. 1019,
1022-23 (Or. 1917); State v. Atwood, 102 P. 295, 297 (Or.), affd on reh'g, 104 P. 195
(Or. 1909); State v. Steadman, 51 S.E.2d 91, 93 (S.C. 1948); State v. Howard, 32 Vt.
380, 399-401 (1859); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 58 S.E.2d 72, 75 (Va 1950); Miller v.
Bennett, 56 S.E.2d 217, 221 (Va. 1949); State v. Cox, 84 P.2d 357, 361 (Wash. 1938);
People v. Lovell, 242 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959 (1963) (abortion legislation was "designed to
protect the natural right of unborn children to life").
325. No. WD 41747, 1990 WL 54277 (Mo. Ct. App. May 1, 1990) (opinions of the
Missouri Court of Appeals that are transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court are not
published), overruled by 799 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
326. Id. at *2.
327. Id. at *3 (citing D. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L REV. 579, 589
(1965)).
328. Strzelczyk v. Jett, 870 P.2d 730, 733 (Mont. 1994) (Gray, J., concurring).
329. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 723 (Ariz. 1985).
concluded that the mother's right to privacy outweighed the fetus's right
to life, it "'neither prohibits nor compels' the inclusion of a fetus as a
person for the purposes of other enactments. " " The court then distin-
guished between the will of the mother in obtaining an abortion and the
will of the tortfeasor against that of the mother in negligence."I In this
author's opinion, it then made the mistake, which many "green" lawyers
make in cross examination, and offered one statement too many: "In
fact, it may further the policy of Roe by permitting the state to protect 'a
woman's right to continue her pregnancy by recognizing [recov-
ery] ... for harm caused by interference with that right."'
In the recently decided California Supreme Court case of People v.
Davis,' Chief Justice Lucas, writing for the majority, took great care to
distinguish abortion from facts presented by the case in ques-
tion-assaults on pregnant women that cause fetal death.' The court
went on to say that although abortion cases must balance rights of the
fetus against a mother's right to privacy, the only rights involved in crimi-
nal homicide cases are those of the child.'
F. What Does It All Mean?
What is a person? When does life begin? These are the questions
courts refuse to answer explicitly yet indirectly answer in nearly every
opinion cited above. "Having written the unborn out of the Constitu-
tion... the Roe majority effectively held that the woman's constitutional
right of privacy overrides a state's interest in protecting the life or health
of the unborn. " ' Scientific evidence and public sentiment are most of-
ten cited as the reasons courts rule the way they do in wrongful death,
homicide, and abortion cases, and the next sections examine both.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. (citing David Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v.
Wade, 45 Mo. L. REV. 639, 664 (1980)).
333. 7 Cal. 4th 797 (1994).
334. Id. at 809-10.
335. Id. When a fetus is born alive, many states say that their analysis in deciding
whether a cause of action in wrongful death exists has nothing to do with abortion,
simply because in their particular case the baby was born alive. See Group Health
Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198, 1199 (Md. 1983).
336. Marian C. Walker & Andrew F. Puzder, State Protection of the Unborn After
Roe v. Wade: A Legislative Proposal, 13 STETSON L REV. 237, 255 (1984). The law
has long been full of constructive creations, such as was noted in 1798: "Let us see,
what the non-entity can do. He may be vouched in a recovery ... He may be an
executor. He may take under the Statute of Distributions. He may take by de-
vise ... He may have an injunction; and he may have a guardian." Thellusson v.
Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (Ch. 1798).
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1. Public Sentiment
The Alan Guttmacher Institute, a private organization funded by
Planned Parenthood, reported 1,590,800 abortions performed in 1988.37
The federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported 1,303,980 abor-
tions in 1982 and 1,268,987 abortions in 1983.' Approximately "two
percent of all abortions in this country are done for some clinically iden-
tifiable entity-physical health problem, amniocentesis, and identified
genetic disease or something of that kind."" The remainder are elective
and are "performed on women who for various reasons do not wish to
be pregnant at this time."' Many of these women may choose abortion
to avoid bringing a child into the world in a socially and financially im-
poverished state; others reason that their moral responsibilities to exist-
ing children take precedence."I "Abortion permits a young girl to estab-
lish her sexual identity through occasional sexual intercourse without
appearing to be sexually available contrary to traditional family-support-
ed moral values."' This rationale helps explain why "the number of le-
gal abortions increased by more than fifty percent in the six years fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade."'
A recent Gallup Poll showed how divided Americans are on abortion:
more than three-fourths believe abortion is murder, yet a majority also
believe abortion should be a woman's right, unfettered by govern-
ment.' In 1993, the Hyde Amendment was re-enacted, banning federal
financing of abortion for indigent women except in cases of rape, incest,
or risk to the life of the woman." Another Gallup survey done in late
337. Henshaw & Van Vort, Abortion Services in the United States, 1987, 1988, 22
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 102 (1990).
338. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT.
ABORTION SURVEILLANCE, 1982-83 1IISS (Feb. 1987).
339. Id,.
340. Constitutional Amendments Relating to Abortion, 1981: Hearings on S.J. Res.
17, S.J. Res. 18, and S.J. Res. 10 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1981).
341. Margaret G. Farrell, Revisiting Roe v. Wade: Substance and Process in the
Abortion Debate, 68 IND. L J. 269, 278 (1993).
342. Id. at 279 (citing ROSALIND P. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN's CHOICE: THE
STATE, SEXUALrIY & REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 221, 222-23 (rev. ed. 1990)).
343. Id.
344. John W. Kennedy, supra note 310 (study commissioned by Chicago based
Americans United for iffe).
345. Paul Savoy, The Coming New Debate on Abortion, TIKKUN, Sept-Oct. 1993,
at 27.
1993 shows that seventy-three percent of Americans support a prohibi-
tion on abortion after the first trimester of pregnancy; even forty-six
percent of those identified as strongly pro-choice agree that abortion
should be limited to the first trimester.3
With this information, the reader may have trouble discerning what
public sentiment actually is. Because abortion has become a topic
lumped together with politics and religion as a cocktail no-no, many
views, other than the extreme left and right, are not adequately voiced. It
is clear, however, that most of America would probably not have a prob-
lem if the Congress or the Supreme Court ruled that abortion after the
third or fourth month was illegal.4 7
2. Medical Science
"The unborn child, by its intrinsic biological nature, is a human being
from conception. It can be nothing else."" s Dr. Blechschmidt wrote:
A human ovum possesses human characteristics as genetic carriers, not chick-
en or fish. This is now manifest; the evidence no longer allows a discussion as to
if and when and in what month of ontogenesis a human being is formed. To be a
human being is decided for an organism at the moment of fertilization of the
ovum. '
Patten emphasizes in his text on human embryology that "[i]t is the pene-
tration of the ovum by a sperm and the resultant mingling of the nuclear
material each brings to the union that constitutes the culmination of the
process of fertilization and marks the initiation of the life of a new indi-
vidual."' Scientific evidence therefore suggests that "a new human be-
ing exists at conception. " "
Even without reliance on these expert opinions, one commentator
presents a compelling argument based on the medical and legal definition
of the end of life. "[T]he irreversible cessation of all functions of the
brain, as measured by a flat electroencephalogram (EEG)," is a universal-
ly accepted method for determining death, just as "the presence of brain-
wave activity is a 'vital sign' of life."' When "[birain-wave activity is
consistently present by eight weeks after conception" and the heart has
already been beating since three weeks after conception it is difficult to
346. Hemler, supra note 46, at 40.
347. Id.
348. Forsythe, supra note 185, at 608-09.
349. E. BLECHSCHMIDT, THE BEGINNING OF HuMAN LIFE 16-17 (1977).
350. C. CORLISS, PATPEN'S HuMAN EMBRYOLOGY: ELEMENTS OF CLINIcAL DEVELOPMENT,
30 (1976).
351. Forsythe, supra note 185, at 609.
352. Hemler, supra note 346, at 40.
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deny that an the eight-week-old fetus meets the most widely accepted
definition of life.'
Furthermore, eight weeks is designated by scientists as the end of the embryonic
period and the beginning of the fetal period. By then, every internal organ and
external feature found in an adult human being has been established .... Surely
we are a compassionate society to seek to err on the side of the "little ones" (Lat-
in meaning of "fetus"), by prohibiting abortion after the onset of brain-wave activi-
ty.
VI. LOUISIANA AS THE MODEL
Louisiana is probably the only state to have the rule that a fetus is a
"person" at conception.' In Danos v. St. Pierre,' the Louisiana Su-
preme Court, in a five-four opinion, found that a "stillborn child has no
rights, and can transmit none." 7 In following this reasoning and the
"born-alive" rule, the court did not allow recovery for the wrongful death
of a six and one-half month stillborn fetus.' On rehearing, the court
reexamined its definition of a fetus.'
The court granted rehearing for the sole purpose of deciding whether
parents may recover for the in utero wrongful death of their baby.'m In
rejecting the "born-alive" rule, the court said that "[i]t would be totally
illogical and arbitrary for the cause of action to depend on whether the
child lives outside the womb for a few minutes.""' The court stated
what is, arguably, the most logical written jurisprudence in this area:
The loss to the parents of a child who otherwise would have been born normal is
substantially the same, whether the tortfeasor's fault causes the child to be born
dead or to die shortly after being born alive, and a cause of action for the loss
should be recognized in either event, at least in the absence of specific legislation
expressing a contrary intent. Moreover, a decision not to recognize a cause of
action when the child is born dead would benefit the tortfeasor who causes a
more serious injury, since the tortfeasor would have to pay damages if his fault
causes a child to be born disabled, but would not have to pay any damages if his
fault causes prenatal death."
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633, 636 n.2 (La. 1981) (5-4 decision).
356. Id.
357. Id. at 636.
358. Id.
359. Id. The decision on rehearing was a stronger 6-3 vote. Id.
360. Id. at 637.
361. Id. at 638.
362. Id. (footnote omitted).
Another basis for the court's decision was that the Louisiana Legisla-
ture in Acts 1976, No. 256, stated that a "human being exists from the
moment of fertilization and implantation."' "The denial of valid claims
in order to discourage fraudulent ones... disregards the very essence of
the judicial process. " ' The Louisiana court recognized that it is illogi-
cal and wrong to say that a fetus is not a person until some arbitrary cut-
off time such as "viability" or "live birth."' Any other result is nonsen-
sical, but unfortunately, only one state has recognized this. Ironically, the
holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed a similar decision
that dates back to 1923.w
This holding was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit of Louisiana in Adams v. Denny's Inc.? In that case, the court
upheld the concept that the wrongful death of a fetus is not an "injury"
to the mother, but rather an "injury" to the child, because a fetus is a
separate "person" from the mother at conception."
In summary, it would appear that Louisiana? is the only state to
adopt the idea that a fetus is a "person" at conception. Many of the Loui-
siana courts have justified their opinions by looking to legislative in-
tent37 or plain meaning,"7' or, in a rare case, by deferring to Supreme
Court abortion law. 2 Qther courts have denounced abortion law as ir-
relevant to their analysis. 3 Can these bodies of law truly be distin-
guished? Many of the arguments used in the abortion debate are striking-
ly similar to some of the reasoning employed by most of the "born-alive"




366. Id. at 638-39 (citing Johnson v. South N. 0. Lt. and Traction Co., No. 9048
(Orl. App. 1923), cert. denied, No. 26443 (La. 1924)).
367. 464 So. 2d 876 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
368. Id. at 877-78.
369. Louisiana may be the only state to adopt this rule, but statements endorsing
such a position have been common in religious literature for centuries. See, e.g.,
Psalm 139:16 (God knew us before we were formed); Ephesians 2:10 (God knew our
purpose and the works for which we were created, even before we were born).
370. See, e.g., supra note 116 and accompanying text.
371. See, e.g., supra note 221 and accompanying text.
372. See, e.g., supra note 132 and accompanying text
373. See, e.g., supra note 277 and accompanying text.
374. Compare Discussion Guide to ONE IN A MILLION (Mars-Hill Productions 1986)
(on ile with author) ("(1) No one knows for sure when human life actually begins;
(2) The emotional and psychological side effects are not very significant when having
an abortion before a fetus is viable; (3) Human value is based upon the relative po-
tential of a human being to contribute to the good of society.") with SARAH
WEDDINGTON, A QUESTION OF CHOICE 160, 248 (1992).
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done so, Louisiana has discovered the inherent problems with drawing
lines such as "born alive" and "viability."
VII. CONCLUSION
State courts in our country have been struggling for years, especially in
the last twenty years, with the definition of "person." To one who has
never attended a law school class, the concept that the word "person"
could assume different meanings in different contexts must be disturb-
ing. The only other time in American history that this author recalls the
United States having different legal meanings for the word "person,"
other than when referring to unborn children, is in the context of slav-
ery,376 and it took this country hundreds of years to realize the outright
falsity and immorality of that distinction."
The major problem for states is that after Roe v. Wade all states are
bound by the Supreme Court's definition of a "person." So, even if a state
is bold enough to make conception the point at which a "person" is de-
fined, like Louisiana?' and Missouri,37 it still must qualify its opinions
by stating that this definition does not affect a woman's right to choose.
In order to clearly resolve the ridiculous inconsistencies between and
within the states, we as a society need to accept the premise that con-
ception marks the beginning of human life. Were this definition to attain
broad support, public sentiment and political leaders would eventually
succeed in pressuring the Supreme Court to permit states to write laws
protecting unborn children.
One of the biggest hurdles, according to many state supreme
courts,"9 is the difficulty of proving causation in the civil or criminal
context when dealing with early stages of pregnancy. Certainly there will
be cases where proof is difficult, but these cases "should be no more
frequent, nor the difficulties any greater, than as to many other medical
problems." ' Commentators discussing the problem have "joined in
375. See Commonwealth v. Carver, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 660, 688-90 (Brockenbrough, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a slave can be a person and a thing, and such a theory will
not interfere with "the full enjoyment of the right of property").
376. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
377. See supra notes 355-74 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text.
379. Compare supra note 110 with note 211 and accompanying text (discussing
jurisdictions which have reexamined this theory).
380. KEETON, supra note 11, at 368 (citing Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y.
1951)); see Woods, 102 N.E. 2d at 695.
condemning the total no-duty rule and agree that the unborn child in the
path of an automobile is as much a person in the street as the mother,
and should be equally protected under the law."" Viability only confus-
es the issues because surely "[tihe loss inured by the mother of a three-
month old fetus should be no less compensable than that of the mother
of a seven-month old fetus."
Professor Prosser best summed up the arbitrariness of "viability" as a
standard by saying that:
[1It is a most unsatisfactory criterion, since it is a relative matter, depending on
the health of the mother and child and many other matters in addition to the
stage of development. Certainly the infant may be no less injured; and logic is in
favor of ignoring the stage at which the injury occurs. With recent advances in
embryology and medical technology, medical proof of causation in these cases
has become increasingly reliable, which argues for eliminating the viability or
other arbitrary developmental requirement altogether.'
From the foregoing analysis it might appear that recognition of the rights
of unborn children by courts is imminent, but state courts are reluctant
to take this step and risk being overruled by the United States Supreme
Court under its precedent concerning abortion law. It is therefore unlike-
ly that a frontal attack on the right to abortion will succeed in establish-
ing rights for an unborn child, especially when the Supreme Court re-
mains inclined not to overturn its decisions.' This avenue is also made
more difficult because the natural voice for the unborn child, the mother,
is often positioned as the unborn child's adversary in abortion cases that
arise before the Court. How then may we seek protection for the un-
born?
Those who seek a uniform definition of "person" that places proper
value on an unborn child should begin to focus more on wrongful death
law and criminal homicide law because in each of those contexts, the
child's parents assume the role of protectors and advocates for the rights
of that child and their interests are not adverse.' The emotional power
381. KEETON, supra note 11, at 368.
382. David Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo.
L REV. 639, 660 (1980) (quoting Timothy P. Reilly, Recent Case, 46 U. CIN. L. REV.
266, 275 (1977)).
383. Id. at 369 (citations omitted).
384. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
385. For other methods that have been used to restrict abortion as a corollary to
finding that conception is the point when a "person" exists, see Abortion Rescue
Movement, 23 SUFFOLK U. L REV. 15 (1989) (maintaining that proper response to
Operation Rescue is to overturn Roe v. Wade); Kelly L Faglioni, Note, Balancing
First Amendment Rights of Abortion Protestors with the Rights of Their "Victims,"
48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1991) (discussing civil disobedience to counter abor-
tion); Jean Rosenbluth, Note, Abortion As Murder: Why Should Women Get Off?. Us-
ing Scare Tactics to Preserve Choice, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1237 (recommending criminal
[Vol. 22: 933, 1995] Jurisprudential Inconsistencies
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
of parents pleading for legal recognition of their unborn children may
sway societal views and incite political action. From the aforementioned
cases, it is apparent that most state supreme courts are willing to change
the definition of "person" or "fetus," but only if state legislatures lead the
way by changing the relevant wrongful death statutes and penal code
provisions. A step by step approach, beginning with the "born alive"
states, should have the effect of changing public attitude towards unborn
children. Only when the public is changed, will the United States Su-
preme Court change.
liability for illegal abortions because fetuses must have equal protection under the
law).

